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Abstract 
Recent and emerging viewpoints in embodiment and knowledge necessitate a re-
examination of epistemology within and beyond the brain. Taking a socio-cultural approach, this 
paper covers two main types of epistemology beyond the brain, namely embodied epistemology 
and non-individualist epistemology. Using citizen science and music to illustrate related concepts 
of intuition, experience, and embodiment, this paper describes intuition as a cultural system, 
beyond a purely individual possession. We describe how–in cultural practices such as music–
intuition acts as mediator between knowledge and embodiment, and, intuition is built and 
modified by experience over time. Building upon Dick’s (1999) notion of “holistic 
perspectivism,” we pose a holistic epistemology approach which embraces knowledge that 
extends well beyond the purely cognitive, in both embodied situations and systemic 
manifestations. As information research becomes increasingly interested in the role of the body 
and its relationship to information, knowledge, intuition, and memory, we argue such an 
approach will uncover further dimensions of non-individualist, systemic, and embodied 
knowledge.  
 
Introduction 
While conceptual and applied approaches to epistemology have long remained a focus of 
Information Science, recent and emerging viewpoints venture into areas of embodiment, 
intuition, collectively-held or socially-constructed knowledge, experience, and memory, among 
others. This paper explores dimensions of epistemology that extend past purely cognitive 
approaches. Examples are drawn from citizen science and music to theorize approaches to and 
applications of knowledge that move beyond the brain. 
Revived interest in the foundations of Information Science such as the nature of 
information and the body (see Lloyd, 2014; Lueg 2015; and, Cox, Griffin, and Hartel, 2017, for 
recent work in this area) and neo-documentation–where experiential and phenomenological 
perspectives are gaining a home (see Gorichanaz & Latham, 2016)–indicates the timeliness of 
this discussion into epistemology. Philosophy and Cognitive Science offer numerous 
perspectives on the subject, as do anthropological and fine arts disciplines such as Dance Theory, 
Ethnomusicology, and Ethnochoreology.  
 3 
Beginning with Husserl (1913) and furthered by Merleau-Ponty (1964), Western 
philosophy began a departure from viewing cognition as its most central element in favor of the 
body, thereby rejecting a “disembodied mind” put forth by Descartes. In their quest for a 
“cognitive phenomenology of the body” in Cognitive Science, Nagataki and Hirose describe this 
period exemplified by Merleau-Ponty as an “embodiment turn” (2007, p. 223). Archie Dick’s 
work (1999) began to raise awareness within Information Science as to the multi-dimensionality 
of epistemology. The epistemological foundations are multifarious; the locus of thinking and 
knowledge is not solely the brain. All of existence, including emotions, contributes to knowing, 
since all of experiencing affects cognition. These dimensions, along with the full extent of 
epistemology beyond cognitive individualism, has not received the attention it deserves within 
our discipline.  
In this paper, we do not propose a new form of knowledge; our discussion makes 
connections between knowledge and embodied cognition, intuition, culture, and systems. We 
draw upon Archie Dick’s (1999) discussion of the lenses by which we choose to view our work 
(holistic perspectivism), and ask whether knowledge beyond the brain can be conceptualized as a 
kind of holistic epistemology, with those facets outside the purely cognitive-individualist gaining 
increased importance as Information Science looks to further its understanding of document-
data-information-knowledge relationships. We provide insight into these under-explored facets, 
using examples of the embodiment of experience, the physicality of knowledge, as well as the 
place of intuition in not only systemic forms of knowledge but in the production of musical 
knowledge. Finally, we recommend the wider study of knowledge aspects found within 
embodied and non-individualist facets, including systemic manifestations.   
Embracing the notion of extended, holistic epistemology in Information Science means 
first examining how knowledge moves beyond the cognitive realm and into the body or other 
system. Taking a socio-cultural approach, this paper covers two main types of epistemology 
beyond the brain, namely embodied epistemology and non-individualist epistemology. Using 
citizen science and music to illustrate related concepts of intuition, experience, and embodiment, 
this paper:  
 Views intuition as a cultural system, beyond a purely individual possession; 
 Describes how–in cultural practices such as music–intuition acts as mediator between 
knowledge and embodiment; intuition is built and modified by experience over time; and 
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 Poses a holistic epistemology, built upon Dick’s idea of “holistic perspectivism,” which 
embraces knowledge that extends beyond the cognitive, in both embodied situations and 
systemic manifestations. 
We offer a preliminary theoretical exploration into dimensions of epistemology within the realm 
of citizen science, and then consider these dimensions in greater depth using results from a 
qualitative study in the domain of music information.  
Literature Review: Embodiment and Knowledge 
The mind-body issue has been upsetting philosophers (primarily) and cognitive scientists 
for centuries. On the one hand are the dualists, typified by Descartes, who hold that the mind and 
spirit are separate and distinct. On the other hand we have the monists, who maintain that 
mind/brain and body are one. Today, there are few contemporary dualists; monism appears to 
have won the day. That said, there are some who believe that the body acts upon the mind. This 
is not the place to delve deeply into dualism and monism (see Rowlands, 1999), but the place of 
the body in cognition and the creation of knowledge is important.  
The computational mind has been referred to by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) as the 
“disembodied mind” (p. 75). Following Lakoff and Johnson (1999), Spackman and Yanchar 
(2013) offer a set of themes to describe embodied cognition: 
1. Embodied mind is comprised of body, environmental/tools, social history, and internal 
representations; 
2. Memory is distributed across the body, environment, and tools and is encoded situationally; 
3. Language and abstract concepts are understood through situated embodied action; and, 
4. Perception and action are inseparable (p. 48). 
These themes set a tone for an analysis of embodied cognition and epistemology in a variety of 
disciplinary and activity settings. The themes have recently been echoed by Sloman and 
Fernbach (2017), who state, “Mental activities do not simply occur in the brain. Rather, the brain 
is only one part of a processing system that also includes the body and other aspects of the 
world” (p. 103). They draw upon the thought of Damasio (1994), who posited “somatic markers” 
as a post-Cartesian means of drawing from all bodily sources for cognition. 
Some of the premises of the above themes rest with, for example, Clark and Chalmers’ 
(1998) ideas that cognition and its processes extend beyond the capabilities of the brain itself and 
incorporates, among other things, phenomenological bases. Walsh adds that, “Understanding the 
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phenomenology of these aspects of our cognitive lives is essential for assessing whether various 
forms of cognitive extension should count as enhancement at all” (2017, p. 35). Phenomenology, 
especially intentionality, helps humans comprehend the complexity of the lived life and how 
cognition situates the totality of life and the body into the full understanding of existence and 
action. 
Perhaps the most complete discourse on embodied cognition and the extension to which 
it can be applied is that by Shapiro (2011). While there is not space to explicate Shapiro’s thesis 
in depth, his program articulates three key elements: conceptualization, replacement, and 
constitution (pp. 4-5). His book is grounded in these elements and they form the essence of his 
view of embodied cognition. One essential component of the above conceptions of embodied 
cognition is that, while standard cognitive science remains valuable, embodied cognition 
challenges an orthodoxy that maintains knowledge is in the brain. The totality of being, though, 
allows for the creation of knowledge by means that extend beyond the brain. 
Of the three elements, constitution seems to have the strongest application to embodied 
cognition. For one thing, cognition is comprised of processes, but also of constituents of 
processes, which are essential to the constitution of embodied cognition. Shapiro (2011) expands 
upon this factor: 
Although metaphysicians disagree over the exact nature of constituents, for our 
purposes we might say that if C is a constituent of an event or process P, C exists 
where and when that event or process exists. Thus, for some process P, if C takes 
place prior to P’s occurrence (even if in the location where P eventually occurs), or if 
C takes place apart from P’s occurrence (even if during the time span of P), then C is 
not a constituent of P (p. 160). 
Shapiro draws, to an extent, from work done by Alva Noë. O’Regan and Noë (2001) write, 
“[W]e propose that experience does not derive from brain activity. Experience is just the activity 
in which exploring the environment consists. The experience lies in the doing” (p. 968). Noë 
adds, “What perception is, however, is not a process in the brain, but a kind of skillful activity on 
the part of the animal as a whole” (2004, p. 2). 
These observations about embodied cognition demonstrate that the concept shares much 
with phenomenology in the philosophical sense. The totality of Being is of primary concern, as is 
the relationship among people, i.e. the interaction and understanding of “I” and “thou.” 
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Embodied cognition, likewise, includes the place of the self in the world and dynamics of 
interrelations. An individual employs intentionality in the processes of perception of the world 
and of interactions in the world. There is a purposeful element, either before or after the act of 
perception.  
A hallmark of phenomenology is that perception is perception of something. As Chemero 
(2009) points out, that phenomenon is both dynamical and a product of realism. Chemero 
concentrates on affordances in a person’s life, borrowing from J. J. Gibson’s (1966) conception 
of properties that enable opportunities for certain kinds of actions. Chemero refers to the idea of 
phenomenological realism, that “allows us. . . to say that conscious experiences are genuinely 
existing aspects of animal-environment systems” (2009, p. 198). Individuals explore affordances 
as a means to connect with the environment, including other individuals. 
One unresolved aspect is whether embodied cognition includes a representational 
component. Chemero explains, “Mental representations. . . are parts of explanations of behavior, 
and their existence is vindicated and their proposed properties are confirmed by the success of 
explanations that call upon them” (2009 p. 50). A representation is then (mostly) accurate as a 
picture of what is supposed to be represented. A representation of a tree emulates an actual tree; 
a representation of dance emulates people engaged in dancing. Chemero (2009) urges that we 
accept the traditional form of representationalism, arguing that an opposing stance cannot imbue 
embodied cognitivism with the phenomenological fullness it requires. Shapiro (2011) accepts 
some form of representationalism as necessary for confirmation of the constitution hypothesis, 
which focuses on the constituents of cognitive processes (p. 189). Representation has an inherent 
semantic quality; in order for a representation to capture what is ostensibly represented, meaning 
must be discerned in what is represented. The competing theory is eliminativism, which denies 
the sematic necessity and avers that neurological psychology is all that is required to conceive of 
something adequately. Embodied cognitivism understandably rejects eliminativism because 
cognition extends beyond the brain in order to actuate a complete perception of a thing or 
behavior. 
The importance of embodied cognition to Information Science may be apparent at this 
point, but a bit greater clarity will be added here. Information, it can be accepted, is more than 
verbal; it extends beyond words on a page and includes all sorts of images (add images in motion 
to the range of possibilities), sounds, tactical sensations, and other phenomena. Perception is a 
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complex, multifarious thing. Gibson (1966) can again be invoked to define the matter: “Each 
perceptual system orients itself in appropriate ways for the pickup of environmental information, 
and depends on the general operating system of the whole body” (p. 58). For a science of 
information and its perception to operate sufficiently, embodied cognition should be the 
foundation upon which that perception and its understanding rests. 
Intuition and Epistemology: Theorizing Citizen Science 
Embodied cognition maintains a stance of “organism-environment mutuality and 
reciprocity” that, through phenomenological realism, can transform our understanding of 
relationships among people (Gibbs, 2005). First-person accounts of bodies and selves must 
include our bodily information systems (Gibbs, 2005) which dynamically interact and interface 
with others at levels of complexity explored through the cognitive sciences. What is not 
commonly thought or considered within the mind-body debates is the notion of culture as a 
shared, social dimension with its collective artifact-resource pool dynamically co-constructed 
using both shared perceptions and individually-held experiences. Similarly, Day expresses the 
notion of indexing the individual to the socio-cultural group, with the group then represented 
through various individual experiences (R. Day, personal communication, October 1, 2016). 
Watson and Floridi (2016) coin the term “sociotechnical network” as an explanation of the 
epistemic agency operating in aggregated, crowdsourced science. In this paper, citizen science 
refers to digital democratic literacy in online instances. An example, Quantum Moves (see 
Sørensen et al., 2016)–wherein code written by scientists is "performed" by para-scientists 
playing games designed to exploit intuition and memory–is an ensemble effort distinctly non-
individualistic in epistemic outlook. 
Early criticism of developments in artificial or machine intelligence pointedly identified 
human intuition as the uniquely valuable capability for complex reasoning and problem solving. 
With computation, “deliberative rationality is not opposed to intuition but based upon it…[and 
it]…sharpens intuition” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). But, how do we conserve and share this 
individual and collective thinking in cultural artifacts, and how does intuition play a key part? 
Both individual and collective realizations depend upon the ability to check the validity of direct 
experiences, inferential proofs, and reliable testimony in concert with an accepted conclusion. In 
our computational age, we document and communicate both individual and collective processes 
in an increasingly online environment – intimately connecting memory and logic; storage and 
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transmission. Citizen science–along with the ensemble arts of theatre, dance, and music–go 
beyond an attempt to bottle artificial intuition and seek answers beyond the brain in sharpening 
collective thinking through creative problem-solving. Dick (1991) sought an educational type of 
cognitive intuition prior to arriving at his holistic perspectivism view. 
Wilder (1967) strikes to the heart of understanding intuition in its role–not as a path of 
imagination–but of truth and companion to creativity. Entirely apart from a native school of 
Cartesian or Kantian psychological quality, and different from the givens of Brouwer or 
Poincaré, Wilder analyzes mathematical intuition principally derived from an accumulation of 
attitudes derived from experience. Building on Wilder, the view presented here recognizes that 
even more than intelligence itself, intuition is formed by one’s cultural environment. Wilder 
realizes that the truth-creativity balance for mathematical intuition rests upon the fulcrum point 
blending community from individual; that is, there exists a collective or cultural intuition 
comprised of concepts and techniques determined by our teachers as “matters of common 
knowledge.” Collective intuitions may be temporarily “false” when viewed from the perspective 
of the evolution of knowledge, although they still serve as guides to individual research as the 
tests for their validity create the base of evidence by which new concepts and discoveries are 
recognized. Wilder associates this process to the natural passing of problems and solutions from 
one generation to the next. 
In referring to schools of thought, Wilder (1981) notes a slight resemblance between 
intuition and paradigm, while Stepin (2005) reinforces our view of the systematic organization of 
all of human knowledge, seeing their differing forms as “relatively autonomous subsystems” in a 
historically developing overall system–perhaps compatible with our traditional interests in the 
science of science. Mathematics as “queen of sciences” encourages us to generalize lessons from 
mathematical intuition; Bunge (1962) extends lessons from mathematical intuition to all of 
scientific research. A number of relevant papers on the recent method and practice of intuition in 
science emerge from an interdisciplinary Princeton collaboration project (Monsay 1997) and 
Hossenfelder (2016) drives the point home in her promotion of citizen science type gamification 
as a crucial feedback loop for intuition-striving individuals to achieve sophisticated social 
solutions. 
The idea of intuition as a cultural system is distinguished from among many variations 
upon the theme of collective rationality, including metacognition, social epistemology, and group 
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decision-making. Macrocognition originated in the mid-1980s with the phenomenology of 
cognitive features of organizational decision-making processes, despite an absence of a secure 
ontological foundation for either individual cognition (mind in the world) or an adequate 
methodology for recognizing common threads among human experiences (Schraagen et al., 
2008). An advanced approach in the new field (Huebner, 2014) builds upon a hypothesis of 
collective mentality along with the requisite theory of individual cognition, in this case 
computational. These new computational theories and models which specify and exploit group 
aggregative (transactive) memories and shared goals are intriguing for the purposes of theorizing 
citizen science. While intuition is nominally unintentional, it transpires along a cognitive 
continuum (Herold, 2014) and the location of genuine collective memory remains an open 
question.  
Research in the neuroscientific basis for intuition may reveal processes for stored, 
unconscious mental representations aiding in the apprehension of synthetic situational 
totalities.  An obvious challenge is for crafting laboratory decisional tasks of an intuitive type 
amenable to instrumental study of decision-making. In addition to the Aarhus University 
quantum researchers findings of superior human intuition (Sørensen et al., 2016), case studies are 
available regarding Galaxy Zoo and cultural heritage collective efforts generally (Ridge, 2014). 
Intuition is a cultural system in the sense that it bears resemblance to an empty form of the 
shared cognitive architectural structure noted by Dennett (1996) as “Gregorian mind tools.” 
Perhaps such a multi-disciplinary “toolkit” supports the multiple perspectives emerging beyond 
individualistic epistemology. 
Relationships among perception, computation, intuition, and knowledge can be viewed in 
tandem with a historical investigation by researchers to explicate the nature of individual human 
memory and logic as de facto shared memory and common knowledge. The living arts and 
sciences resound with page-stage and score-performance conundrums, so why should an 
embodied cognitive information science be exempt?  
“[I]f it is accepted that our categories of thought and structures of meaning are rooted in 
bodily experience and are constantly being projected and negotiated in the course of 
everyday life, attempts to build intelligent systems from abstract rule structures, or to 
specify fixed and complete meanings for a system to be built, can never succeed” 
(Beeson, 1997, p. 217); 
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“The only information system designs which are morally acceptable are those which put 
a primary emphasis on improving the possibilities for face-to-face interaction within the 
organization—those which take dialogue, interpretation and an individual’s search for 
meaning as sacred” (Boland, 1987, p. 377). 
The ineffable quality of information, its mutability, its seeming self-transformative capacities, all 
of these unknowns are progressively more rigorously studied under the new rubric of philosophy 
of information. If there exists a cognitive continuum from the raw data of the world towards 
agreed human intellectual output, then our participation as isolated individual minds traverses 
this informational band through cooperative social memory and collective mental creativity of 
harmonious concrete objects. The key intersection is between collective epistemology and the 
scientific culture of intuition in an ensemble versus solo interpretation. In acknowledging the rich 
literature of the latter since Husserl and Jung on tightly individualized notions of intuition—we 
are beyond the brain in the effort of this paper, looking to the epistemic life of para- and 
scientific groups. 
Musical Knowledge, Embodiment, and Experience 
To illustrate some of the discussion points surrounding epistemology, intuition, and 
embodied cognition, examples from the domain of music are presented and discussed here. 
Examples are drawn from a recent study that examined 11 music practitioners’ views on 
knowledge and information within musical contexts, among other aims. Embodied cognition, 
experience, and intuition emerged as important indicators for the presence of musical knowledge.  
Music is a particularly appropriate domain for this discussion, as the mind-body issue has 
appeared within research in musicology and ethnomusicology, music philosophy, as well as 
music anthropology, to name only a few disciplines. In his book How Musical Is Man?, 
anthropologist John Blacking offered this definition: “Music is a synthesis of cognitive processes 
which are present in culture and in the human body: the forms it takes, and the effects it has on 
people, are generated by the social experiences of human bodies in different cultural 
environments. Because music is humanly organized sound, it expresses aspects of the experience 
of individuals in society” (1973, p. 83). In his definition of music, Blacking touches on the first 
of Spackman and Yanchar’s themes to describe embodied cognition, namely that “embodied 
mind is comprised of body, environmental/tools, social history, and internal representations” 
(2013, p. 84). 
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Ethnomusicologist Charles Seeger distinguishes between “talking about music” and 
music itself (making music): “The relationship of the (intrinsic) music-rationale known by the 
musician to any of the (extrinsic) speech-rationales of music or to the whole collection of them 
constitutes one of the fundamental problems of musicology” (1960, p. 225). Manfred Bukofzer 
(1956) makes a similar distinction between knowledge of music (musicology) and knowledge 
about music (performance practice). Yet another prominent Ethnomusicologist, Mantle Hood, 
emphasizes how that field is “committed forevermore” to Seeger’s problem (1971, p. 227) of 
music-related speech versus making music: talking about music is never as close to the “truth” as 
the musician’s intrinsic knowledge of music. Seeger’s problem also incorporates the third of 
Spackman and Yanchar’s themes to describe embodied cognition, that “language and abstract 
concepts are understood through situated embodied action” (2013, p. 84). 
Gilbert Ryle (1949) differentiated between “knowing how” as a kind of intelligent 
performance of tasks and “knowing that,” a less developed understanding of a concept. This has 
been explored in dance theory by Carr (1978) and more recently by Pakes (2003). Another of 
Spackman and Yanchar’s themes of embodied cognition is related to the “knowing that” concept, 
particularly related to memory and cultural practice like music traditions: “Memory is distributed 
across the body, environment, and tools and is encoded situationally” (2013, p. 84). Much earlier 
in the 18th century, in his text The New Science, Vico put forth what came to be known as the 
maker’s knowledge principle describing a “special kind of cognitive relation to the thing that has 
been made” (Gaukroger, 1986, p. 29). Vico’s contemporary Hintikka invokes Aquinas’ 
definition of practical knowledge as “the cause of what it understands” (1975, p. 89), a concept 
Hintikka notes is very similar to maker’s knowledge. This is relevant to the fourth and final of 
Spackman and Yanchar’s themes, that to the maker/musician: “perception and action are 
inseparable” (2013, p. 84).  
Study Overview 
The study’s purpose was to examine the nature, description, representations, and ideas 
related to music information objects (MIOs), illuminating how music is understood, described 
and actualized or represented across cultures. Expert music practitioners from various traditions 
were asked to describe and conceptualize what music is and how it is represented in many forms, 
using a theoretical framework proposed by Weissenberger (2015) to classify music information 
objects.  
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Interview procedures. Semi-structured, ethnographic interviews were conducted in 
person, by telephone, or using Skype with 11 expert practitioners in 10 different musical 
traditions. Of 18 interview questions, two pertained directly to the question of knowledge and 
information: 1) In your view, what is musical knowledge and what does it take to build musical 
knowledge? 2) Do you think there is a difference between music information and music 
knowledge? Other questions focused on related concepts such as knowledge transmission, 
teaching contexts, and learning (both solo and ensemble), as well as aspects related to 
documenting music traditions using musical notation or Western Classical terminology such as 
composer and arranger (for the full list of questions, see Weissenberger, 2016).  
Participants. Participants were selected using a purposive “expert sampling” approach. 
All possessed significant expertise in the performance and teaching of a musical tradition, and in 
some cases had additional expertise in music composition or instrument building. The study’s 
sampling frame required participants to be over 18, an active performer and teacher, have 
demonstrable expertise in a musical tradition, and have a requisite level of familiarity with the 
researcher. Participants varied in gender musical instrument, and musical tradition, as shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Study Participants by Musical Tradition and Gender 
Musical Tradition/Instrument of Participant Gender 
Jazz pianist/ Irish traditional piano and flute player  Male 
Classical harpist Female 
Trinidadian steel pannist Female 
Indian classical sitar and tabla player (Carnatic & Hindustani) Female 
Latin Jazz guitarist Male 
Chinese zheng and guqin player Female 
Irish traditional fiddle player (Sliabh Luachra style) Male 
Irish traditional fiddle player (Clare style) Male 
Lakota musician, singer, and dancer  Male 
Ugandan Baganda musician (multiple instruments) Male 
Cape Breton traditional-style piano player Female 
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Music Practitioners’ Views of Musical Knowledge 
When asked of any differences between music information and musical knowledge, and 
how they might be different, musicians saw information as distinct from knowledge. In 
describing the conceptualization of musical knowledge within the context of their musical 
tradition, the ability and experience of being able to do something – embodied knowledge, or 
“knowing how” in this context – became an important part of differentiating knowledge from 
information according to practitioners. Two views of knowledge emerged: the first presents 
knowledge as the embodiment of many years of experience, employing an increasingly honed 
intuition; the second view centered around knowledge as applied, demonstrable information. 
View 1: Knowledge as embodied experience. In her differentiation between knowledge 
and information, the Trinidadian steel pannist explained, “Knowledge comes from knowing, 
which comes from bodily experiences with your mind. I do think knowledge and information are 
two different things. Information is the material that becomes knowledge. If you tell me [about 
something], you are telling me information, but to you it’s knowledge, because you have 
experienced it.”  
Very similar to the “material that becomes knowledge” definition of information, the 
classical harpist’s definition of information was “what you find out in books and scores, and 
what…how you’re able to access that information” whereas knowledge means taking that 
information and “incorporate[ing] it into the body of knowledge in your head, and how you 
can…use it…to make music…either interpretively or creatively.” She distinguished between 
“information found in books and scores” with “knowledge in your head,” including aspects of 
appropriate use, creativity, and interpretation in practice.  
Experience and embodiment factored into the Chinese zheng practitioner’s view on 
music knowledge, a monist view of mind and body:  
“I think…to an instrumentalist, you have to know your instrument…your knowledge is 
practical: fingering, whatever practical thing…notation... But, to another level, I think it’s 
a process to know yourself [laughs]. What is music knowledge…there are so many things 
I’m still learning. …The other day, I taught a student a traditional [zheng] piece I’ve 
played for many years, and I suddenly realized something new that I never thought about 
[before]. Because, the instrument [zheng] is a plucking instrument, right? But there is a 
melodic line connected…always connected inwardly with these notes, but I never thought 
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in this way. And I had a sudden revelation about how to perceive the piece differently 
than before.”  
Overlapping with the idea of appropriate use and interpretation of information as a mark 
of knowledge, the Clare-style fiddler described his view, one that leads into the second view of 
knowledge as applied, demonstrable information:  
“It’s knowledge and experience and understanding…I mean, if you can talk to people 
[students] about these people [great musicians of past and present], and if you’re in a 
situation where you can play some recordings for people and in turn be able to decipher 
what we’re listening to: ‘that’s happening right there…let me show you how he’s doing 
that right there; let me show you how he’s doing this’ so you can take the mystery out of 
the recordings; you can say ‘in order to do that, this is what you need to do.’”  
Knowledge of Ryle’s “that,” such as the techniques and styles the Clare-style fiddler 
hears in the recordings, is a direct product of his experience and embodied knowledge –the 
“knowing how.”  
Intuition. Both intuition and experience act as mediators between Ryle’s knowing that 
and knowing how. The link between mind and body are inseparable within the music 
practitioner, whose experience generating sound through increasingly informed body movements 
hones their intuition for their musical tradition. Nagataki and Hirose (2007) prefer to view this as 
an example of tacit knowledge in musicians, invoking the idea of bodily “habit” built over time 
in place of intuition (the authors do not mention Bourdieu’s habitus in this context). In contrast, 
the view presented here is those that “know how” possess increasingly complex intuition for 
their musical tradition, gained through experience over time; this extends far beyond acts of 
information gathering and retention (Ryle’s “knowing that”), or bodily habit. Perhaps this is 
what maker’s knowledge means in the context of musical practice for those who practice it. 
For the Chinese zheng practitioner, knowledge contains a certain level of abstraction and 
intuition: “…knowledge is more profound; information is more direct – it is obvious to see; it’s 
visible. But some knowledge is invisible; you need to see with your heart.” At another point in 
her interview, she returned to this theme: “You know, there’s a lot of abstract teaching [in zheng 
practice]…really, there are not many verbal explanations; many things are understood by sound, 
or comprehended by [the] mind.” 
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 View 2: Knowledge as applied, demonstrable information. The second viewpoint 
articulated by musicians was the idea of information as merely elements taken on their own out 
of context, with knowledge then as applied, demonstrable information-in-context(s). The 
Ugandan music practitioner also viewed the demonstrable, embodied aspect of musical 
knowledge as the distinguishing factor separating it from the concept of music information:  
“What I think about knowledge, is that knowledge is demonstrated. You can demonstrate 
information too, but where the difference comes in is that a knowledgeable person is able 
to take information and apply it appropriately. So I think the difference might come in the 
application. Someone who is knowledgeable is able to take the facts they have ingested 
and apply them in the appropriate contexts. It’s the knowledgeable people that teach us 
the information.”  
The view of information presented by the Clare-style Irish fiddler and the Ugandan music 
practitioner is based in applied aspects of performance – demonstrating techniques, or being able 
to explain how the information is applied in musical contexts – was their view of knowledge. 
The Clare-style fiddler explained:  
“I take in the information, I store the information, and in turn I’m storing up my musical 
knowledge and because I do that, I think – after a while, if you turn a tap on, [knowledge] 
starts to flow. So as you go along, gathering information, in turn building up your own 
musical knowledge, educating yourself… Because, we’re students – you, and me – we’re 
students of the music we study and play… And you become a better student of the music 
you’re playing – you’re a better student than you were twenty years ago; I’m a better 
student today than I was twenty years ago. …people ask you, ‘why does that variation 
sound like it’s an ending variation, and why does this variation sound like it’s in the 
middle of something?’ And the structure of it…all those things come from knowledge, 
and from understanding – it comes from information because you study, and then they 
come from conclusions you reach from all that stuff…in a big pot [gestures]…in your 
head.” 
This explanation incorporates both Ryle’s “knowing how” of technique and musical ornaments, 
but also the “maker’s knowledge” of Hintikka that relates to the creative process of 
ornamentation and melodic variation used in Irish traditional music. 
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Experience. The Indian Carnatic and Hindustani music practitioner described a deep 
understanding of context and appropriateness (as well as embodied, physically manifest 
understanding of making music) as the difference between knowledge and information. She 
described a “layman’s” approach as information, but an expert’s understanding as the 
perspective of a knowledge-bearing person: 
“[Is there a difference between music information and knowledge?] Definitely! 
Knowledge is just like what I told you where the music critics – you come with the 
knowledge to criticize somebody – to a critique view. A person with just general 
knowledge: “Well, I like music; I like to listen to it; I enjoy music” may just come there 
and… “OK, well, I think I like that piece…” you know? And write something about it, 
but a person with knowledge will actually say, “These were the notes that were bad, or 
these phrases were good or it was exploited well in this octave…or it really depicted the 
full essence of that raga. Or, the person was not in rhythm; or, the instrument went out of 
tune and they didn’t care.” That’s the difference between information and 
knowledge…right?  To me. A person with knowledge will actually critique it properly, 
but a person with just information is just going by a layman’s ear: “Ok, I like it.” 
Her view of the music critic’s role as purveyors of embodied knowledge (they are all 
musicians themselves, she emphasized) was similar to the Clare-style fiddler’s idea of “forming 
conclusions about this stuff” as being the mark of a knowledgeable person, not a layman: “The 
information might mean an awareness of music in general, and perhaps music knowledge means 
you might want to come to conclusions along the way…so I store it [indicates the head] and now 
I want to come to some conclusions, I want to discuss it….”  
The Indian music practitioner’s similar view underscores the applied musical experience 
of the music critics: 
“That’s the thing – all the critics are musicians. That’s the difference in…all those 
critics…they are musicians. I mean, I was critiquing later on…under an anonymous 
name, because I didn’t want anybody to know that I was [laughing] writing. So, I had a 
different name…so I did that too. I’m a musician, so I knew exactly what I was writing 
about. So…um, it is constructive…very constructive…and you have to take it in a 
constructive light, because they are musicians who are writing.”  
 17 
Applied musical experience over time is what makes a knowledgeable musician, according to 
these practitioners, as opposed to a non-experienced layperson who can only “know that” about 
music. 
Making and Socio-Cultural Knowledge 
Returning to Hintikka’s views on maker’s knowledge, whereby a creator possesses 
special knowledge of her creation, he writes “the underlying idea of this tradition may be said to 
be the idea that we can obtain and possess certain especially valuable kinds of theoretical 
knowledge only of what we ourselves have brought about, are bringing about, or can bring 
about” [emphasis in original] (1974, p. 84). Hintikka writes of maker’s knowledge that it is 
“…supposed to cover also ‘doer’s knowledge,’ for no distinction between poieses and praxis is 
intended” (1974, p. 84). While not a focus of this paper, the particular relationships between 
epistemology, phenomenology, and praxis are explored further by Budd (2005). 
Historically, Hintikka identifies Maimonides as a medieval proponent of the “genuine 
knowledge as maker’s knowledge” idea (1974, p. 84). Maimonides, as quoted by Hintikka, 
wrote: “There is a great difference between the knowledge which the producer of the thing 
possesses concerning it, and the knowledge which other persons possess concerning the same 
thing” (1974, p. 84). How this applies in the music creation process may vary based on 
individual and socio-cultural differences, but embodied experience (a key component in musical 
knowledge) plays an important role in musical practice and the production of musical 
knowledge.  
The Ugandan practitioner described his experience working with Nigerian music 
students, attempting to give a final course exam after electricity was lost. He had no access to a 
generator, so instead he composed a piece of music and taught it to the students; after learning 
the piece, they analyzed it as their exam. The passage below describes the practitioner’s view on 
that process, an example of “maker’s knowledge” in cultural context: 
“…and I was reminded of how — and I don’t know if there is such a thing as ‘African’— 
but I find that whatever I did was…just so natural; it’s what we do in Africa, 
you…cannot pretend to analyze something so well that you did not create, because you 
are not a part of it; there is a part of it you don’t know or really comprehend.” 
Sound. One potential issue, outside the scope of this paper, is the relationship between embodied 
musical knowledge and the assumption that this embodiment manifests itself primarily in the 
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production of sound. Individual and socio-cultural notions of music are certainly not restricted to 
a sonic form, a belief held by all but one of the study participants, and also propounded by 
philosopher Jerrold Levinson (1980). The Trinidadian steel pannist explained a situation where 
embodied musical knowledge was taken to an extreme in an effort to keep a piece of music 
secret for a major music competition: 
“…they actually learned an entire song with their fingers. Not even the band members 
knew what the song was. Everybody literally just learned rhythm and patterns with just 
their fingers on the instrument, because it was a secrecy thing. They didn’t want anybody 
to know what they were doing. And when they got on stage, not even the performers 
knew what [song] they were doing! And then when they got out onto the stage…got out 
into the parade…they did it for the first time with pan sticks, which is actually what gives 
it the pan sound, and everybody said, ‘Whoah…they’re droppin da bomb!’” 
From her description, steel pan band members learned a complex arrangement without the use of 
musical sound; they learned instead via individual physical embodiment of the score and 
“dropped da bomb” of sound only when reaching the concert stage. To “know” music outside of 
sound is to know not only the physicality of what is required to make sound, but also relies on a 
musician’s intuition built over years of embodied experience.  
The role of culture. Culture has been suggested by some as acting as a lens for 
embodied cognition. Examining music perception and African-American music traditions, Iyer 
argues “cognitive universals grounded in human bodily experience are tempered by the cultural 
specificity that constructs the role of the body in musical performance” (2002, p. 387). The 
following passage describes epistemic realities of the Ugandan practitioner’s experience teaching 
Nigerian music students: 
“…Before we even get into what music practitioners do, we have to talk about who is a 
music practitioner; what should they embody…if I had gone in [classroom in Nigeria] a 
classical pianist who uses music theory…you know, I would have been frustrated 
because… none of these kids knew even how to read music…but…they are very 
intuitive, they are visual learners, they are aural learners…I mean, they can remember 
things, they can memorize things and remember them in ways that we can’t. You know, 
we’ve been colonized by reading and writing, if you may ([sounding forced] which is 
good…that’s how our system works) but, being in a position where I could mediate those 
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two worlds…you know, it was very humbling. I was like, “My gosh, this thing would 
have fallen flat if I didn’t have all these skills,” and to them it was so natural…they 
actually enjoyed it, and when I gave them… I mean, we talked about partials and 
microtones, and they could not comprehend what I was really talking about. I gave the 
example of the spectrogram and they could not understand, and then one professor walks 
in, and he brings in water in a jar; drops a pebble and the waves…you know the water 
creates waves…and the students understood this much better. They were like ‘yeah, this 
makes sense.’ Or, he ties a rubber band on two points…on two poles and plucks it and is 
like ‘This is what [participant’s name] is talking about.’ …I was like ‘Wow, there is a lot 
to learn about music transmission and teaching.’” 
In the above story, the Ugandan practitioner described alternate ways of knowing that extend 
beyond Western literacy expectations for music (music notation and music theory) and into 
aural/oral and experiential knowledge. He demonstrates the value of these epistemic approaches 
in situ, dispelling the notion that they might be subordinate to any other way of knowing.  
Ochieng (2008) describes the origins and debate surrounding the notion of “African 
philosophy” as distinct from European counterparts, and how several African philosophers have 
portrayed such a philosophy. Identifying with Bordieu’s idea of habitus, Ochieng posits 
“Epistemology is embodied insofar as it involves not only the workings of the mind, but the 
experiences of the body. It is performative insofar as dispositions are cultivated through social 
mimesis, modeling, and adaptation, as well as distinction, differentiation, and deviance” (2008, 
p. 344). He rejects Kenyan philosopher Odera Oruka’s rationalist allegiance, criticizing his 
interview methodology and resulting classification of African sages’ knowledge as either “folk” 
or “philosophic” because Ochieng claims Oruka did not consider the influence of tacit 
knowledge on the sages’ responses: “In taking the Cartesian mind/body dualism as his starting 
point for sage philosophy, Oruka short-circuits richer accounts of African sorts of knowledge” 
(2008, p. 345). Future mind-body epistemological research must further our discipline’s 
understanding of these rich “sorts of knowledge” outside of the Western-centric philosophical 
traditions.  
Future Research and Conclusion 
In trying to address the whole individual and groups of individuals, an earlier paper by 
Archie Dick included his holistic perspectivism (1999) viewpoint. Dick’s work began to push 
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Information Science’s accepted boundaries of epistemology, particularly regarding what he 
terms “indigenous knowledge.” He argues when Information Scientists choose lenses for their 
work, such as a cognitive individualist perspective, they examine phenomena according to what 
might be most useful for that particular application or aim; not to supersede or replace other 
equally-valuable approaches (such as the socio-cultural view or phenomenological view, for 
example). Of these numerous perspectives (cognitivism, poststructuralism, phenomenology, and 
so forth), Dick emphasizes they “do not offer radically different accounts of LIS realities but 
instead account differently for the same LIS realities” (1999, p. 319). 
Dick’s South African perspective embraced epistemic dimensions that, at the time, were 
considered outside the most central concerns of Information Science such as orality/aurality, 
phenomenology, embodied knowledge, intuition, and memory. His descriptions challenging 
Ingwersen and Järvelin’s information seeking and retrieval model (Dick, 2006) allude to a kind 
of collective intuition shaped by social enculturation. Regarding information seeking and 
epistemic dimensions, Dick states “There is...an alternative way of knowing and constructing 
reality at work in indigenous knowledge,” something he deems an “alternative epistemology” 
(2013, p. 9). Ochieng (2008) argues for the term “contextual epistemology” with the 
understanding that humans create numerous contexts to explain knowledge.  
Advancing Dick’s “holistic perspectivism” further into the realm of embodiment, we 
propose the idea of a holistic epistemology: a direction for future work into the full extent of 
epistemology and the human experience that encompasses a host of epistemic realities within 
and beyond the brain. Foundations of Information Science are shifting towards embracing 
knowledge that extends beyond the purely cognitive-individual perspective, in both embodied 
situations and systemic manifestations. In our discussion of knowledge dimensions within this 
paper, we have used preliminary theoretical positions on citizen science and applied, situational 
aspects of music to illustrate both embodied and non-individualist epistemologies. The related 
construct of intuition acts as a cultural system, beyond a purely individual possession, along with 
mediating knowledge and embodiment over time in the context of musical practice.  
Taking a holistic approach to epistemology beyond the brain will ensure we are poised to 
meet the challenges of an increasingly diverse discipline. This may prove valuable as 
information research becomes increasingly interested in the role of the body and its relationship 
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to information, knowledge, intuition, and memory. Such an approach will uncover further 
dimensions to these facets of non-individualist, systemic, and embodied knowledge.  
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